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1. Executive summary 
A brief review of the literature, informed by comments from a range of tax specialists, suggests 
four principal groups of reasons why tax systems do not yield higher revenues in many 
developing countries: 
 Internal political factors 
 Administrative constraints 
 External political factors: multinational companies and other investors 
 The structure of developing country economies 
However, the issues involved are complex, and simple and direct answers do not exist. Professor 
(Emeritus) Richard Bird, chair of the Advisory Group of the International Centre for Tax and 
Development at the Institute for Development Studies, comments that “My more than 50 years of 
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work on these matters in more than 50 countries continues to provide me more with questions 
than with answers.” 
Internal political factors 
The problem may be that governments do not prioritise tax revenue mobilisation, and if they do, 
they may find it difficult to reform systems which stakeholders (certain taxpayers, the tax 
administration or political insiders) benefit from. Seeing that tax collection is part of a political 
bargaining system, it is necessary to look at reform prospects from a political economy lens. 
Administrative constraints 
Many developing countries face the dual challenge of a lack of modern infrastructure, such as IT 
systems and property registers, and weak capacity in tax authorities due to shortage of skilled 
staff.  Training and capacity building for new and existing staff coupled with resources to make 
investments in modern infrastructure should help increase the amount of taxes collected.  
External political factors: multinational companies and other 
investors 
 Bilateral tax treaties: Many developing countries have effectively signed away their rights 
to tax multinational companies operating within their borders through bilateral tax treaties. 
Aggregate estimates of the scale of the problem are not available but some country 
assessments are indicative of the problem. It is estimated that developing countries lost 
over US$ 800 million in 2011 as a result of treaties with the Netherlands alone, and 
estimates show that US tax treaties cost non-OECD countries around US$ 1.6 billion in 
2010. There have been recent calls for developed and developing countries alike to 
assess the developmental impact of their tax treaties and renegotiate the treaties 
accordingly.  
 Tax evasion and avoidance in international trade: Developing countries’ tax losses from 
aggressive tax planning and avoidance by multinational companies is sizable. Profit-
shifting by multinational corporations through transfer mis-pricing results in the erosion of 
the tax base and, consequently in lower tax revenues. Recent estimates suggest that 
losses could be between USD 100 to 240 billion annually in global corporate income tax 
revenue. Tax avoidance and transfer mis-pricing have received heightened international 
policy attention in recent years through the OECD BEPS process. The question is 
whether the proposed reforms, which have largely been put forward by OECD countries, 
are suitable for or will have positive effects for low income countries. 
 Tax avoidance in the extractive sectors: Profit shifting, and other kinds of tax avoidance, 
is a real concern in the extractive sectors, especially in mining.  Estimates around tax 
losses in the extractive sectors show that the losses are sizable and that developing 
countries are particularly vulnerable. For example, research suggests that African 
countries could have collected an additional USD 70 billion in tax over the 2003-08 period 
if they had taxed the mining industries operating in their countries in the same way as 
Australia does. Taxing progressive gross income as opposed to taxing companies’ profit 
may make the system less vulnerable to profit-shifting. 
 Tax exemptions and incentives given to investors: Developing country governments 
typically offer various tax exemptions in order to attract investment, which lowers tax 
revenues. The problem with this practice is that exemptions do not appear to result in 
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higher investment and are, therefore, a pure loss of revenues. The problem is also that 
exemptions are often used for political reasons, and consequently, risk being linked with 
corruption. One obvious solution to this problem is to take away exemptions. If this is 
politically difficult, the negative effects of exemptions could be mitigated by inducing 
transparency into the system, either by making rules about exemptions firmly stated in 
laws and regulations, or by publicly disclosing information about exemptions. 
Structure of developing country economies 
Many developing countries are characterised by a small tax base, a cash-based and informal 
market structure, and a heavy dependence on agriculture: all of which makes taxing difficult and 
tax rates low.  Broadening the tax base may be politically more feasible than increasing tax rates. 
In addition, efforts to include the informal sector in the tax net may have positive indirect impact 
by contributing to improved governance and accountability. 
2. Realistic expectations of tax increases for developing 
country economies 
Developing country governments collect much lower proportions of their GDPs in tax revenue 
than the governments of the OECD countries do: 10-20% compared with 30-40%. The lowest tax 
shares are observed in South East Asia and in the Pacific region, at levels close to 10%. Sub-
Saharan Africa, the MENA region, and Latin America have higher average tax-to-GDP ratios 
(around 18%), although there is great variation within each region. Latin America and MENA 
have seen larger increases in tax revenue in recent years than Sub-Saharan Africa. Within 
Africa, countries differ according to income level, with upper-middle income countries 
approaching OECD levels of tax-to-GDP ratios.  Low-income countries still lag behind, with many 
having rates below 15% of GDP, which is generally considered the threshold below which 
contemporary governments find it hard to finance their basic functioning and services (Mascagni 
et al, 2014).  
Tax take is broadly proportional to national income levels because in higher income (and 
urbanised, non-agricultural) countries it is much easier for tax agencies to tap into revenue 
sources without incurring high collection costs or generating adverse political reactions (Moore, 
2013). A high-tax state may even be seen as part and parcel of development. As economic 
development creates a need for institutions that can support and sustain markets, it 
simultaneously fosters incentives for higher levels of taxation (Besley and Persson, 2014). 
As country tax effort indices (revenue collections relative to estimated revenue potentials) for 
many developing countries show, there is considerable potential to increase tax revenue 
(Mascagni et al, 2014). However, it is not realistic to expect developing countries to reach the tax 
proportions of OECD countries quickly; there are no quick fixes and no prospects for sharp 
increases. Tax reform and public financial management reforms more broadly have been 
happening over decades in many of today’s high income countries, and we should not expect 
similar changes to happen very quickly in low income countries.  Even an increase of two 
percentage points in the tax to GDP ratio over a period of five years would be quite good, as 
such an increase would mean that tax revenue has not only kept up with GDP growth but 
performed better than the economy (Giulia Mascagni, personal communication, 2017). 
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ICTD’s Mick Moore argues that we should be sceptical of claims that any specific tax innovation 
could lead to major increases in revenue collection in low income countries in the short term – 
that is, within years rather than in decades. Tax collection has a ‘sticky’ nature, with total 
revenues collected by governments varying little from year to year. This is partly because, 
especially in low income countries, the behaviour of tax agencies is governed by annual 
incremental collection targets set by ministries of finance. The ‘sticky’ nature also reflects a more 
structural factor. Revenue agencies are highly ‘networked’ organisations, dependent on active 
cooperation from a wide range of other stakeholders, including ministries of finance, the police, 
border security forces, and many others. As a result, new tax policies and administrative 
improvements within a revenue agency may have limited impact if not supported by 
corresponding changes in the network (Moore, 2013).  
Where rapid increases in tax revenues have occurred in recent times, they have often been 
coupled with social upheaval in one way or another. Looking at the evolution of tax revenues 
across 18 countries over the past century, Besley and Persson (2014) found that significant rises 
in tax have come about as a result of war (the two World Wars), and the introduction of direct 
withholding of income taxes which coincided with World War II. Some developing countries have 
seen radical reforms of tax administration in recent decades – notably Peru in the early 1990s, 
and Uganda and Rwanda in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These reforms happened when 
state power was effectively reconstituted after near-collapse, including the breakdown of revenue 
collection. In these cases, rapid increases in tax revenue were possible because another 
characteristic of the ‘sticky’ nature of tax collection was removed: the political bargaining system 
over tax, which had in effect collapsed with stakeholders having lost their bargaining power 
(Moore, 2013). 
So, how should we go about inducing reform to increase tax rates in developing countries? 
Professor Richard Bird suggests that one should go into specifics in details, focus on policy 
process, and be patient, very patient (personal communication, 2017). 
3. Internal political factors 
Although tax rates, to an extent, go hand in hand with economic development, economic growth 
does not mechanically translate into higher taxes. Widening the tax net and increasing the tax 
base require governments to put effective policy in place and to be determined to ensure 
compliance. Having the political will to increase taxes is therefore necessary (Besley and 
Persson, 2014). Governments know where the potential is and where most of the gaps are; if a 
government wants to tax, it will (Jalia Kangave, personal communication, 2017).   
Political will is, in turn, a product of a country’s political bargaining structure around tax. The 
process of bargaining and exchange is central to decisions about the design of tax regimes and 
to operational decisions about which taxpayers will be pursued by the tax authorities, how, and 
how far. The tax collection bargaining process involves at least four categories of actors and 
interests: taxpayers, tax intermediaries, governments, and revenue collection organisations 
(Moore, 2013). These stakeholders can all benefit from a status quo of low taxes and 
discretionary tax collection practices. Therefore, appreciating their role in tax bargaining 
processes is essential to any reform project.  
In every country, a great deal of theoretically tax-liable income, transactions or assets escapes 
the tax net, sometimes because the administrative costs of pursuing them are too high, and 
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sometimes because political influence and corruption enable some people and companies to 
escape their obligations. Tax regimes tend to be biased in favour of taxpayers with the greatest 
bargaining power, who can most easily evade or avoid taxes, and whose cooperation is most 
valuable in the long term (Moore, 2013; personal communication 2017).  
As a result of this distribution of bargaining power, governments show great reluctance to tax the 
personal incomes of their own rich citizens as well as the increasingly large accumulations of 
capital invested in real estate in low income countries. In fact, income tax and property tax – the 
two best ways to tax the wealthy – are almost wholly ineffective outside taxes on the wages of 
formal sector employees (Kangave et al, 2016). From an organisational and logistical 
perspective, there are good prospects for increasing the tax take in low income countries by 
establishing more effective property tax systems, but because such taxes affect relatively 
wealthier people who have more political influence, they have been very difficult to effectively 
introduce in practice (Monkam and Moore, 2015). Among taxpayer constituencies we also find 
domestic businesses and multinational companies. Their relations vis-à-vis governments, and 
the resulting tax losses, will be discussed in section 6 below. 
The other three identified tax stakeholders (the political and administrative insiders) may also 
benefit from a sub-optimal tax process, and stand in the way of reform. Tax collectors and tax 
administrators can be quite powerful groups in developing countries, since their specific expertise 
makes them difficult to replace. They therefore have the bargaining power to resist reform and to 
get away with extracting revenues from inefficient or even illicit tax practices for private gain 
(Mascagni et al, 2014). Revenue agencies may also transfer funds informally and illegally to their 
political masters, and while we have no hard information on the extent to which this takes place, 
these flows seem to be quantitatively and politically significant in many low income countries 
(Moore, 2013).  
A recent study exploring the political economy of tax reform in Bangladesh illustrates how the 
bargaining process around tax favours insiders and the politically powerful. The authors found 
that the repeated failure to reform the country’s tax system was due to significant resistance to 
change that cut across political, economic and administrative elites. In the current, highly 
ineffective tax system (with a tax share of only 9% of GDP), the economic elite is catered for by 
low and predictable tax rates to businesses, tax administrators enjoy extensive discretion and 
opportunities for corruption, and the political elite can use the system to raise funds and distribute 
patronage and economic rents (Hassan and Prichard, 2013).   
Seeing that politics is at the heart of tax systems, adopting a political economy approach to 
reform is necessary in order to identify the progressive reformers within governments and 
revenue authorities; ways in which they can be assisted without putting their domestic political 
support under threat; and the incentives required to persuade the more reticent to allow reform of 
their tax systems (DFID 2016).  Bird (2013) echoes this approach, arguing that focus should be 
on the process instead of the precise configuration of the reform package, and that sustainable 
reforms need to be developed in-house by countries themselves. 
4. Administrative constraints 
Many developing countries face considerable administrative constraints in revenue mobilisation. 
These concern the dual challenges of a lack of modern infrastructure, such as IT systems and 
property registers, and weak capacity in tax authorities due to shortage of skilled staff. 
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In Uganda, for example, one of the biggest challenges to revenue collection is around collecting, 
managing and analysing data and information. This problem affects how the revenue authority 
shares and analyses the information it has, as well as how it accesses and utilises information 
from other government agencies. This is made even more difficult by the fact that the economy is 
largely cash-based, which makes it hard to track transactions. Improving capacity and resources 
to access and analyse information could result in increased revenue collection. (Jalia Kangave, 
personal communication, 2017) 
In terms of capacity, the greatest challenge for tax administrations is retention of skilled staff, 
particularly those with scarce and valuable skills in IT, accounting, and forensic auditing (IDS, 
2014). The drain of skilled personnel away from tax administration poses a serious obstacle to 
improving capacity and therefore to increasing tax revenue in developing countries (Mascagni et 
al, 2014).  
In Uganda, for example, there are several angles to this brain drain (Kangave, personal 
communication, 2017). First, competent professionals often move with their former bosses to 
other government agencies. This is partly due to better pay in other agencies, but also because 
in some cases contract terms (for commissioners) require that the person cannot serve for more 
than a certain number of years, which increases the need for building capacity, particularly of 
lower level staff. Human resource decisions within the Ugandan Revenue Authority are also to 
blame for capacity shortages. There is a general feeling that staff are not allowed to develop 
capacity within a given field because they can be moved from one position to another with little 
warning. Someone may undergo training in one sector, start working in the position they have 
been trained for, and within a year or two are moved to something totally unrelated. Finally, 
capacity is also drained away from the public sector as good auditors are likely to end up working 
for big companies, banks or the larger professional services firms (IDS, 2014).  
Another administrative challenge for revenue agencies concerns coordination with other entities. 
Collecting revenue efficiently and effectively involves establishing robust connections and 
interactions between various kinds of systems.  Different units within the revenue collection 
apparatus need to learn to co-operate with one another and establish IT systems that interface 
with one another. Similarly, revenue collection units need to work effectively with banks, utility 
companies, property registration systems, passport authorities, tax practitioners and a wide 
range of other public and private sector actors. It takes time and much continuous effort to 
ensure that these connections work effectively. (Mick Moore, personal communication, 2017)  
5. External political factors: multinational companies and 
other investors 
Shortcomings in the ability and willingness of some developing country governments to 
effectively tax domestic businesses and multinational companies operating in their countries can 
constitute a very large loss in tax revenues. Four such barriers to effective tax mobilization are 1) 
bilateral tax treaties and the resulting loss of right to tax multinational companies; 2) tax evasion 
and avoidance in international trade; 3) loss of potential tax revenues from the extractive sectors; 
and 4) tax exemptions and incentives given to investors.  
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Bilateral tax treaties 
One major reason why tax revenue is not higher in many developing countries is that these 
countries have effectively signed away their rights to tax multinational companies operating 
within their borders through so-called bilateral tax treaties.   
Around 3,000 bilateral tax treaties are currently in force, governing whether, how, and how much 
signatories can tax multinational companies and other cross-border economic activity. Often 
justified on the grounds of needing to prevent double taxation, tax treaties which lower the tax 
paid by international business are often used to compete against other countries for foreign 
investment. However, the relationship between treaties and investment has repeatedly been 
questioned, and the evidence suggests that any benefits that tax treaties might bring cannot be 
assumed (Hearson, 2016).  
Bilateral tax treaties can lower developing countries’ tax revenue both in aggregate and relative 
to richer, capital-exporting countries. The full scale of the problem is difficult to assess, but some 
estimates have been published. The Dutch Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations 
has estimated that developing countries lost US$ 812 million (€770 million) in 2011 as a result of 
treaties with the Netherlands alone, and the IMF estimates that US tax treaties cost non-OECD 
countries around US$ 1.6 billion in 2010. At the developing country level, Bangladesh has been 
estimated to be losing approximately US$ 85 million every year from just one clause in its tax 
treaties that severely restricts its right to tax dividends. These estimates only focus on two types 
of losses: lost dividend taxes and lost taxes on interest payments. Tax treaties also cause many 
other losses – such as lost profit tax contributions and lost tax on capital gains, royalties and 
services fees – but the size of these losses is still unknown (ActionAid, 2016).  
In addition to suppressing overall tax paid by multinationals, the second problem associated with 
bilateral tax treaties is how they disproportionally repress tax revenues for developing countries. 
Tax treaties carve up tax rights between two countries that could claim the right to tax a 
multinational – the country where the (foreign-based) corporation makes money (‘source-based 
taxation’) and the country where the internationally active corporation is based (‘residence-based 
taxation’). Most tax treaties restrict the source-based right to tax foreign corporations making 
money locally, in other words restricting developing countries’ right to tax. For example, in 2004 
Uganda signed a tax treaty with the Netherlands that completely took away Uganda’s right to 
collect tax when a corporation pays out certain earnings (i.e. dividends that meet certain criteria) 
to shareholders resident in the Netherlands. A decade later, as much as half of Uganda’s foreign 
direct investment is owned in the Netherlands, at least on paper (ActionAid, 2016; for an in-depth 
review of tax treaties in Uganda, see Hearson and Kangave, 2016).  
Whilst the developmental impact of bilateral tax treaties has not received much attention in the 
past, this is now starting to change with calls for developing and developed countries alike to 
assess the impact of their tax treaties and ensure they do not contradict development policy and 
aspirations. A new dataset, the ActionAid Tax Treaties Dataset, includes more than 500 treaties 
that low- and lower-middle income countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia have signed since 
1970. From this public dataset researchers and civil society campaigners can draw attention to 
those treaties that impose the greatest restrictions on developing countries’ taxing rights and 
advocate for renegotiations. A number of developing countries have recently begun to reconsider 
their approach to tax treaties. South Africa, Rwanda, Argentina, Mongolia and Zambia have all 
cancelled or renegotiated agreements since 2012, and others, such as Uganda, are undertaking 
reviews (ActionAid, 2016).      
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The Netherlands and Ireland have recently reviewed the impact of their treaty networks on 
developing countries, and started offering renegotiations to some of their treaty partners as a 
result (Hearson, 2016). However, as a group, OECD countries appear to be moving towards 
treaties with developing countries that impose more restrictions on the latter’s taxing rights. The 
UK and Italy are tied as the countries with the largest number of very restrictive treaties with 
lower income Asian and sub-Saharan African countries (ActionAid, 2016). 
Tax evasion and avoidance in international trade 
Another major reason why tax revenue is relatively low in developing countries is that tax is 
evaded and avoided by multinational companies. While outright tax evasion is illegal, tax 
avoidance and aggressive tax planning is more of a grey area. 
One such tax avoidance practice is profit-shifting by multinational companies. This involves mis-
pricing goods and services transferred within a multinational company group – amongst 
subsidiaries and affiliates, or between a subsidiary and the mother company – with the aim of 
transferring profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Transfer mis-pricing results in the erosion of the tax 
base through the outflow of capital from high to low-tax jurisdictions, and thus in lower tax 
revenue (Mascagni et al, 2014). 
With currently available data, it is not possible to pinpoint the amount of tax that multinational 
groups avoid each year through shifting profits to tax havens. However, recent estimates 
reported by the OECD indicate that the losses from base erosion and profit shifting could be 
between 4% and 10% of total global corporate income tax revenue, or USD 100 to 240 billion 
annually (Durst, 2016). 
While aggregate estimates of profit shifting are difficult to make, individual examples of such 
practices abound. For example, an investigation by ActionAid into the British multinational, 
Associated British Foods, found that by shifting over a third of its subsidiary’s profit out of 
Zambia, the company has denied the Zambian government USD 17.7 million since 2007 (Lewis, 
2013). ActionAid also found that SABMiller, one of the world’s largest beer companies based in 
the Netherlands, deprived African governments of as much as USD 20 million per year by 
channelling profits to sister companies through tax havens as ‘management fees’, and running 
procurement through a subsidiary based in Mauritius (ActionAid, 2010).  
Transfer pricing and profit shifting have received great attention in international policy circles in 
recent years, notably through the G8/G20 tax agenda. Many of the policy prescriptions focus on 
increasing transparency and the flow of tax-related information across countries (IDS, 2014). 
However, for real change to result from these efforts and for change to benefit lower income 
countries, two conditions need to be met.  
First, substantial reductions in transnational tax avoidance require sustained collective action by 
the governments of many countries, especially those of the OECD and the large and emerging 
middle- and low- income countries. However, the countries whose cooperation is most needed 
are those best placed to maximise their individual shares of investment and tax revenue by 
pursuing competitive tax policies (Moore, 2013). Effective collective action in this sense requires 
all governments to stop using taxes to compete for investment, which might be easier said than 
done. As pointed out in a recent IDS publication, while the British Prime Minister has been 
promoting the G8/G20 tax reforms, the UK Treasury has continued to develop new tax incentives 
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such as reduced corporate taxes on income attributable to intellectual innovation to attract capital 
from abroad (IDS, 2014). 
The second condition concerns lower income countries and whether or not they are likely to be 
able to reap the potential benefits of the international tax agenda’s focus on transparency and 
information sharing. Two barriers exist in this regard. The first is linked to the balance of 
bargaining power between low income country governments and international investors: power 
too heavily tilted towards the latter would reduce the potential benefits to the former. The second 
barrier relates to the capacity of developing country tax authorities to effectively deal with tax-
avoiding practices and to fully take advantage of tax-related information that is becoming 
available from other countries (Moore, 2013). 
Tax avoidance in the extractive sectors 
The biggest single cause of low tax takes in many developing countries is low taxation in their 
extractive sectors. The extractive sectors, especially mining activities which are more likely than 
oil and gas to be entirely in the hands of overseas private transnational companies, are grossly 
under-taxed in low income countries. There are a range of reasons for this, the most general 
being that mining companies are very powerful political actors (Moore, 2013).  
The ways in which investments in the extractive sector are taxed vary widely across countries, 
with various mixes of royalties and taxes on rents and on business profits. The taxation trend has 
in recent decades gone from being predominantly based on royalties (which are usually based 
on the gross value of the product that is extracted) to various kinds of levies based on the net 
income that a company derives from the extraction of product. This has reduced the risk to 
extractive companies of being taxed on loss-making investments. However, income-based 
natural resource taxes are much more difficult for governments to enforce and natural resource 
taxation has become increasingly vulnerable to revenue erosion. The seriousness of this 
vulnerability is magnified by the fact that extractive companies typically engage heavily in 
transactions with other members of their multinational groups, in which the companies have 
substantial opportunity to engage in profit-shifting (Durst, 2016). 
The extent of profit-shifting taking place in the extractive sectors, and the resulting loss in 
government revenues, can be substantial. One study estimated that, globally, profit shifting of 
various kinds reduces the income tax base of the oil and gas sector by between 12% and 35%, 
depending on the characteristics of the country’s tax system, and that non-OECD countries 
generally appear to be more vulnerable to profit shifting than OECD member countries (Beer and 
Loepick, 2015). Some aggregate estimates suggest that, while turnover in the mining sector 
increased globally by a factor of 4.6 during the period 2000-2010, tax revenues earned by African 
governments increased only by a factor of 1.15.  
According to one study, a group of African governments could have collected USD 70 billion in 
additional tax in the years 2003-8 if they had levied the same implicit rate of tax on mining as the 
Australian government (Moore and Lundstøl, 2016). Another study found that profit-based 
corporate tax made only a very modest contribution to mining revenue in Tanzania and Zambia, 
and that Zambia, in one year alone, could realistically have increased its tax revenue from mining 
by more than USD 1 billion, which would have been more than the total net development aid to 
the country for that year (Lundstøl et al, 2013). 
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If developing countries are not able to fully benefit from the international tax agenda with its focus 
on transparency and information sharing, can anything else be done to stop these countries from 
losing such sizable amount of government revenues? One suggestion, as a temporary measure, 
is for countries to introduce progressive royalties, based on gross product value. The rate of a 
progressive royalty adjusts with changes in product prices, production volumes, or both, so that 
the rate of the royalty will generally change in correlation with the extractive company’s net 
income.  This could help mitigate the risk involved in income-based levies until the vulnerabilities 
of income-based instruments have been addressed (Durst, 2016). 
Tax exemptions and incentives given to investors 
Another major cause of the tax gap seen in many developing countries is tax exemptions. 
Governments from low-income countries offer various tax holidays and exemptions that are 
difficult to categorise and control, with the aim of attracting investors and fostering economic 
growth (Mascagni et al, 2014). Governments are often under strong political and other pressures 
to grant large-scale investment incentives and, in effect, give away tax revenues (Mick Moore, 
personal communication, 2017).   
There are several problems with how tax exemptions are generally given. First, tax incentives are 
often given in ways that are inefficient and not transparent. The discretionary manner in which 
many exemptions are given have a purpose, as they are widely used by politicians to reward 
political supporters and businesses willing to contribute to political party funds or private bank 
accounts. In Tanzania, for example, a major driver of the spread of tax exemptions in that 
country was the increasing competition within the ruling political party, with the resulting search 
for political finance to fund that competition. Business offered political financing in return for tax 
exemptions (Therkildsen, 2012). 
Another problem with tax exemptions is that they are not economically effective. Many, if not 
most, tax incentives actually have little impact on investment levels. Data from investment 
motivation surveys shows a high redundancy ratio for tax incentives, meaning that investors 
would have invested regardless of the incentive (James, 2013). Research also shows that it is 
likely that governments could attract more private investment if they were to grant fewer tax 
incentives and rather use the additional revenue to address the problems that rank high in the 
minds of potential investors, such as the poor quality of road, port, transport, electricity and water 
services (IDS, 2014).  
Eliminating or substantially reducing tax incentives is usually seen as a low-hanging fruit in tax 
revenue mobilisation. Since most of the companies involved are already in the tax net, additional 
revenue could be obtained at a relatively low administrative cost. Where such reform has been 
possible, for example in Mauritius, the results have been positive (Mascagni et al, 2014). 
From a political point of view, however, reform may not be that easy. Politicians (at least in 
countries where markets are politicised, like in many developing countries) like discretionary 
investment incentives because they facilitate political and administrative corruption. Moreover, 
the cost of tax incentives is usually unknown and dispersed over a long time while the political 
benefits, as well as the private benefits to the person entitled to make the decisions, are 
immediate. Finally, incentives are easier to provide than infrastructure, labour skills or other 
investment climate improvements (James, 2013). 
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If reform is difficult for political reasons, two sets of transparency measures may at least help 
make tax exemptions less usable as a political tool. The first type of transparency reform focuses 
on making the system of granting and administering investment incentives less discretionary. 
This is done by clearly defining criteria for granting incentives in relevant laws and/or regulations 
to limit discretion in the approval, verification and valuation stage of granting the incentives 
(Munyandi, 2011).  The second way of inducing transparency into granting and administering 
investment incentives focuses on publicly disclosing information. Identifying, quantifying and 
publicising tax expenditures—the revenue cost of preferential tax treatments—can be a powerful 
tool in avoiding and scaling back preferences that do not generate some offsetting social benefit 
(G20, 2011).  
There are two types of information that transparency initiative may focus on. The first type 
concerns public disclosure of decisions about any granted investment incentive, i.e. the public 
announcement of which investors benefit from such incentives. These can be put into databases 
and disseminated to the public (James, 2013). In this case, adverse reactions from the public 
would primarily work to discourage favouritism and corruption. The second type of transparency 
initiative focuses on analysing and disseminating the actual revenue cost of investment 
incentives. By bringing the cost of investment incentives upfront, it is possible to place a budget 
on incentives and ensure that they are part of responsible economic policy making. In this case, 
transparency would primarily inhibit economic policy that would be deemed wasteful and contrary 
to public benefits (USAID/RCSA, 2004).  
6. Structure of developing country economies 
The final barriers to effective revenue mobilisation in low income countries are related to the 
shape and structure of national economies. It is much easier to increase revenues in wealthy 
countries where economic transactions are officially recorded in various ways, and take place 
through banks and other financial intermediaries. Instead, many developing countries are 
characterised by a small tax base, a cash-based and informal market structure, and a heavy 
dependence on agriculture, all of which makes taxing difficult and tax rates low. 
The first of these problems is the small tax base. Income below a certain threshold is not and 
should not be taxed due to considerations related to poverty and equality. This implies that in 
countries where a large proportion of the population lives in poverty, a considerable share of 
GDP is not taxable (Mascagni et al, 2014). This means that comparatively few individuals and 
companies are taxed. For example, in Tanzania, a country where the population exceeds 35 
million, a mere 286 companies contribute about 70 percent of domestic tax revenues (Fjeldstad 
and Moore, 2009). Similarly, 0.4 percent of taxpayers in Kenya and Colombia are estimated to 
account for 61 and 57 percent of total domestic tax revenues respectively (Baer, 2002). Hence, if 
only a small proportion of these companies and individuals chose to evade tax, this could have a 
large impact on these countries’ public revenues.  Recalling the discussion about internal politics 
and the bargaining powers of wealthy and influential individuals, broadening the tax base, rather 
than changing tax rates, could be the key to increasing tax revenues in many low-income 
countries (Besley and Persson, 2014). 
With undeveloped markets comes a high degree of informality, which is another constraint to 
revenue mobilisation. Since by its nature informal economic activity falls under the radar of tax 
officials, the administrative cost of reaching the informal sector can be very high. This sector is 
usually composed of a multitude of small and micro enterprises that are likely to be below the 
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threshold for paying tax or just above it (Mascagni et al, 2014).  However, as recent analysis from 
Uganda shows, there is also a small proportion of very wealthy individuals who thrive in the 
informal sector. Their businesses have various characteristics: they transact mainly in cash, do 
not keep proper books of account, are not registered with government agencies, many do not 
deposit their money in bank accounts, and they have less than five employees. The same 
research also found a large informal sector within the formal sector in Uganda. In such cases, 
professionals – both in the private and public sector – who may pay taxes on their employment 
income and/or importation of goods, take advantage of the loopholes created by the informal 
sector to undertake additional lucrative commercial enterprises on which they do not pay taxes 
(Kangave et al, 2016).  
An increase in formality is a key part of the process by which taxation increases with 
development. That said, economic growth does not necessarily mean less informality, and the 
government has a large role to play in this process by constructing a functional legal system. 
Besley and Persson (2014) argue that government institutions and tax systems evolve together; 
a weak and unaccountable state is unlikely to have strong motives to build effective systems for 
revenue mobilisation, and its citizens are unlikely to develop strong norms for tax compliance. 
Finding ways to include more of the informal sector in the tax net can also have benefits in 
relation to state-building and democratisation as this would allow for broader engagement of 
citizens on tax matters (Joshi et al, 2012) and could have positive effects on the tax-
accountability relationship. Taxation engages citizens collectively in politics and leads them to 
make claims on government. The government is in turn compelled to respond to these citizen 
demands in order to enhance tax compliance and sustain state revenues. This relationship 
induces accountability and responsiveness (OECD, 2010).   
Finally, the composition of economic activity affects tax revenues. In many developing countries, 
the industrial sector is typically underdeveloped while agricultural sectors are large. This has 
revenue implications since taxes from the former sector are usually considered easy to collect 
due to visibility and accessibility of firms, while taxes in the agricultural sectors are typically hard 
to collect (Mascagni et al, 2014).  
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